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There are certain issues involved in the
negotiations for the acquisition of Florida that make
the transaction especially conspicuous in the annals of
American history. The general situation of the politi-
cal arena at this time, the complexity of world politics,
and the prominent position of the United States diplomati-
cally are apparent in their bearing on the negotiations.
In the affairs of Florida is seen the germ of the future
American attitude toward European relations with the
Western Hemisphere, the logical sequence of which was
the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine as the principle
upon which the American government would shape its policy
toward European povfers in the future.
The student is tempted to speculate on how
different American history would have been had Spain
retained Florida both as regards relations with foreign
powers and international development . A study of the
transfer reveals the intimate connections which the
acquisition of this territory had with the internal
growth of America economically, socially, and politically,
and to expansion in other quarters. By the cession of
<c
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Florida to the United States the annexation of Texas
was probably postponed many years, which eventually
involved the United States in a war with Mexico
resulting in the acquisition of vast territory. By
the Florida treaty the boundary on the south was
definitely fixed and did away with all further rais-
understanding over that line. If the United States
had not acquired Florida, Southern industries would
have been retarded b3cause of lack of sea-ports and
the consequent inconvenience of importation and
exportation while the mouths of the principal water-
ways were in foreign possession. Moreover, effective
blockade of the southern coast during the Civil War
would have been difficult with Florida in foreign
hands. The mere expulsion of Spain from the borders
of the United States had no little significance, for
with the revolutions incident tc Spanish rule in
America, it is doubtful if the hand of the United
States could have been restrained with Florida in a
turmoil like the rest of Spanish America. Besides,
there was the danger of having such a hot bed of
political and social unrest at the very threshhold,
attracting malcontents, or outlaws, seeking an asylum
from justice. The probability of this condition had
been abundantly evidenced before the close of the
negotiations
.
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Eariy Relations with Spain.
The seeds of future controversy were sown
during the Revolution by the terms Spain demanded as the
price of an American alliance. She saw in the revolt of
the colonies an opportunity for consolidating and extend-
ing her American possessions. Yfhile Spain entered the
war as an enemy of Great Britain she never became an ally
of the United States. As the war went on and the issue
became inde endence, the moral influence of a successful
colonial revolt vms, no doubt, dreaded by the rulers of
a nation which possessed the greatest colonies of the
world. It meant a young republic on her own borders with
political principles opposed to those of Spain.
But another motive of hostility was the
desire to perpetuate her commercial policy. All foreigners
were excluded from tr de with Spanish colonies. It was
only since England had possessed the Floridas that she
had been forced to make some changes in her monopolistic
system. The control of the Gulf of iiexico was therefore
the ruling principle cf the Spaniard in all his diplomatic
dealings affecting the United States, and this principle
*
c
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necessarily carried with it the corollary that the
Mississippi 3iver must be closed to all foreign
commerce
•
Y/hen Jay was sent to Madrid to effect
an alliance he was informed that the chief difficulty
in the way of any treaty lay in the pretensions in
regard to the navigation of the Mississippi by American
citizens. This policy of Spain was made known to the
American Congress in February, 1700, through "Articles
which his Catholic Majesty deems of great importance to
the interests of his crown and on which it is highly
necessary that the United States explain themselves
with precision.
"That the articles are:
1. "A precise and invariable western boundary of
the states."
2. "The exclusive navigation of the river
Mississippi .
"
3. "The possession of the Floridas."
"The lands on the left or eastern bank of the
1.
Mississippi. •*
1. Chadwick - Relations of Urited States and Spain 1:18.
Quoted from Diplomatic Correspondence III, 489.

Fortunately for the United States all attempts at an
alliance failed.
In the peace negotiations of 1782-1783
America found herself compelled to resist Spanish
claims. The treaty of 1763, to which both France and
Spain were parties, provided that "The river Mississippi
shall be equally free as well to -:ne subjects of Great
Britain as to those of France in its whols breadth or
length from its source to the sea and expressly that
part which is between the said island of New Orleans
and the right bank of the river as well as the passage
both in and out of its mouth. It is furthermore
stipulated that the vessels belonging to the subjects
of either nations shall not be stopped, visited, or
subjected to the payment of any duty whatsoever".
Spain, in exchange for the restitution of Cuba and
Havana, ceded to England "Florida with Fort Augustine
and the Bay of Pensacola as well as all that Spain
possessed on the continent of Ilorth Arerica to the
east or the south-east of the river Mississippi and
in general everything that depends on said countries
1.
or lands".
1. Cradwick - Relations of United States and Spain.
Chapter I.
c
The treaty of 1783 had confirmed the right
of the free navigation of the Mississippi to the American
citizens. But Spain held that this was not a right but
a privilege which was given to Great Britain, and which
she had no legal right to transfer to a third party.
By royal proclamation of 1763, East Florida
and Tvest Florida were formed into two distinct districts
divided by the Apalachiccla River. Both districts had at
first the thirty-first parallel as a northern boundary,
but the next year the boundary was changed to 32° 28' -
which change later gave rise to much controversy.
In the provisional treaty of 1782 between
the United States and Groat Britain there was a secret
article whicn was as follows: "It is hereby understood
and agreed that in case Great Britain at the close of
the present war shall receive or be put in possession
of West Florida, the line of North boxmdary between the
said province and the United States shall be a line drawn
from the mouth of the river Yassous where it unites with
1.
the Mississippi, due east, to the river Apalachicola.
1. Walloy - Treaties and Conventions, 1:584.

Great 3ritain evidently hoped to regain possession of
Florida, but the province was ceded to Spain at the
close of the war. The boundaries, however, were not
defined. This gave Spain the opportunity to claim the
province as defined in the secret treaty, the existence
of which had come to her knowledge.
The points of dispute upon which
Secretary Jay was instructed not to yield in the
negotiations carried on with the Spanish minister
Don Diego de Gardoqui at Philadelphia, were the
boundaries of Florida as fixed by the treaty with Great
Britain, and the free navigation of the Mississippi. To
these questions were added the regulation of commerce,
the irritating subject of Indian aggressions, and the
claims of American citizens for illegal captures by
Spanish privateers.
Throughout the negotiations Spain held
rigidly to her stand on the navigation of the Mississippi.
Jay proposed to Congress to agree to "forbear the use"
of the rights on the Mississippi for a period of twenty-
five years for certain commercial arrangements and to
1.
leave the boundary question to further compromise.
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of a special mission to foreign nations and the payment
on any cession of territory connected therewith. On
January 11, 1303, James Monroe was appointed to act with
Livingston in negotiating a treaty with Franca to secure
"our rights and interests in the river Mississippi and
in the territories eastward thereof". There was consider-
able doubt, however, as to whether the cession had
actually been accomplished, or whether the Floridas #ere
included in the territory ceded. Monroe was given,
therefore, a second commission to the Spanish court for
the same purpose—to be used if necessary.
Meantime, Livingston's diplomacy at Paris
took on a more aggressive tone. He was ambitious to get
the negotiations well underlay before Monroe arrived.
He reminded Talleyrand of Spain's breach of the Treaty of
1795 and threatened the seizure of New Orleans and the
Floridas as a retaliatory act by the United States which
would have the support of England. The fact that Napoleon
suddenly found himself face to face with a war with
England changed his policy decidedly. Lacking the command
of the sea he wac forced to abandon his Now World enter-
prise. But he could not allow England to obtain Louisiana,
cc
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neither would he hand it back to Spain. He would instead
transfer it to the United States for a sum of money which
he sorely needed. And so the Americans were dramatically
informed that France did not have the Floridas to sell,
but was quite willing to part not only with Hew Orleans
but with the whole of Louisiana.
The American envoys felt confident that
their action would be endorsed by Jefferson and so did
not hesitate to assume the responsibility of concluding
a treaty by which the United States acquired a territory
which doubled its area for the cum of sixty million
francs. Their instructions had dealt with New Orleans
and the territory east of the Mississippi; they had
purchased Hew Orleans and the vast unknown territory west
of the river. It set the seal of the future predominance
of the United States over the westerti continent. The
navigation of the I.iississippi was now independent of the
favors of foreign nations and the motive for disloyalty
in the '.Vest »vas removed.
The treaty was signed April 30, 1803, but
it was the thirtieth of the follovring Uovember before
(
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Kapcieon's agent received possession of the province from
the Spanish governor. Seventeen days later William Claiborne
received possession of the province for the United States.
These dates are significant as emphasizing the fact that
ITapoleon did not legally possess Louisiana "when he sold
it to the United States. This, together with the fact
that Napoleon had promised Spain that France v/ould not
alienate Louisiana to any other power, but if France did
not occupy it herself she would restore the province to
Spain, has led certain historians to criticise adversely
the whole transaction from a moral standpoint. As between
France and Spain there can be no doubt that the Spanish
government, which was at that time under the heel of
Kapoleon, was bullied into the transfer, ileither did
Napoleon fulfill his part of the bargain in regard to the
delivery of the kingdom of Etruria. This, however, was
not a concern of the United States. Again, the promise
made by Ilapoleon not to alienate Louisiana to any other
power was not a part of the treaty of Ildefonso but was
made in July, 1802, two years after the cession. The
breach of such a promise might well give rise to just
complaints and protests by Spain against France, but
c
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when the Spanish minister at Washington protested to
"..adison, the latter could refer hini to the communication
of ^-r. Cevalios (the Spanish minister of foreign affairs)
to the America-, plenipotentiary at Madrid, in a note dated
May 4, 1803, in which the Spanish minister referred the
United States treaty envoys to the French government to
1.
negotiate the acquisition of Louisiana. Consequently the
government of the United States was surely right in
considering this a positive recognition by Spain of the
legality of entering into the transaction which had taken
place. It does not seem, therefore, that either lav/ or
morals would require the United States to repudiate the
bargain because of the later protests of Spain.
1. Americar State Papers, Foreign Relations - 11:570
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The Boundary Disput9
In buying Louisiana the United States
incurred two boundary disputes which resulted in many
years of controversy. One remarkable feature of the
purchase was that it did not define the boundaries of
the province. The treaty of cession gave as its def-
inition of Louisiana the description given in the treaty
of Ildefcnso between Prance and Spain — "The colony or
province of Louisiana with the same extent as it now has
in the hands of Spain and that it had when France possessed
it and such as it should be after treaties subsequently
entered into bet-.veen Spain and other states". Wo mention,
at the time, was made of West Florida but it soon bocame
a question of vital importance. The 7/ording of the treaty
was contradictory in its assumption. Certain facts are
clear, however; that Louisiana previous to 1763 when France
possessed it, extended eastward to the Perdido River and
included I-obile; that France ceded all her possessions
east of the Mississippi and the island of Hew Orleans to
Great Britain in the Treaty of 1763; that Spain ceded
Florida tc Great Britain in exchange for Havana and Cuba;
that Great Britain organized that region bordering on the
Gulf of Mexico, east of the Iberville River and of Lake

Porchartrain into two governments - East Florida and
Vest Florida, separated by the line of the Chattahochee
and Apachecola Rivers; that Spain owned again nothing
east of the dividing line until 1783 when Great Britain
ceded her both the Floridas.
Louisiana, therefore, "as it had been in
the hands of Spain" could not be interpreted to include
V.'est Florida; but if the United States bought Louisiana
with the extent that it had when France possessed it,
she surely got a large part of '-Vest Florida. Spain
considered the Floridas as distinct from Louisiana.
That territory in her hands had extended from the Lissis-
sippi westward and constituted the territory, according
to her understanding, which she had ceded to France in
1800. The land between the Iberville and the Perdido
which she had received by cession from England in 1783,
v/as a separately organized territory obtained by a wholly
different title. That it was not a part of the cession
of 1800 was underwood by France as shown by the instruc-
tions issued by the French '..linister of Marine on November
26, 1G02, which stated that the boundary between "the
state of his most Christian Majesty and those of his
c
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3ritanic Majesty should be irrevocably fixed by a
line drawn down the middle of the Mississippi River
firob its source to the river Iberville and from there
by a line dravm down the middle of that river and of
Lakes -'-^aurepas and Porchartrain to the sea. New Orleans
and the island on which it stands still belongs to
France. Such is still today the eastern limit of
Louisiana. All the east and north of this limit marks
1.
part of the United States, or "Vest Florida.
That Livingston understood that they
were not buying West Florida is apparent in his letters
to Madison. He says, "I have every reason to believe
that the Floridas are not included. They will, for the
present at least, remain in the hands of Spain".
Conversations with the Frenchmen iviorbois, and Talleyrand
seems to have had the effect of changing his attitude.
In a later letter to Madison, after giving an account
of his conversation with Talleyrand, he advises him to
take possession to the river Perdido. He also points
out that Great Britain may have designs upon West Florida
and that if it is in the hands of the United States East
1. Henry Adams - History of the United States, 11:6-7
Quoted from Instructions Secretes, November 26, 1802. MS 3
.
<
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1.
Florida -would be easy to obtain. The diplomats of
the young republic apparently fell in with the methods
of eighteenth century diplomacy. They made up their
minds after signing the treaty that the sale inclxided
as much of West Florida as had at one time formed a
part of French Louisiana. The letter of June 7, 1803,
signed by Livingston and Monroe forwarding the
ratification of the treaty says, "We are happy to have
it in our power to assure you that on an examination
of the subject we consider it incontrovertible that
8.
West Florida is comprised in the cession of Louisiana".
Je erson and Madison needed no urging from Paris as to
the desirability of claiming part of flest Florida. They
realized the domestic value of the territory more
orobably than their representatives in Europe and were
determined to oush their ba.rgain to the uttermost. At
separate times Livingston and Monroe had advised the
administration to exchange part of the territory west
of the Mississippi for the Floridas. Madison now warned
them to entertain no proposition of the sort but to
collect the nroofs necessary to substantiate their claims
1. Chadwick - Relations of United States and Spain, 1:66-70
2. State Papers II, June 7, 1803.
r<
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i.
to the Perdido. Jefferson was ready to extend
the purchase to the Perdido "the ancient "boundary
of Louisiana" and expected "all in good time" to
possess "the whole Florida region without sacrificing
2.
one inch of the waters of the Mississippi". He
even took: pains to embody his views in a pamphlet
"The Limits and Bounds of Louisiana" which had
considerable effect upon public opinion and
determined the attitude of the administration and
its supporters.
1. American State Fapers - Foreign Relations, 11:527.
2. Letters of Jefferson - Ford - VIII :249.
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The O c cupation of .Ves t Florida.
Leaving the diplomatic features out of
the picture, the observer cannot fail to discern the
elements of inevitability in the events •which led to
the extension of the dominion of the ^nited States
over Florida. V.e have seen that it was Florida
rather than Louisiana that was in the minds of the
statesmen during; the negotiations which ended in the
purchase of Louisiana. If the possession of Florida
was desirable before, it now became essential to the
well-being of the nation.
From a physiographic standpoint, a
foreign sovereignty over the region was not to be
considered. The streams afforded American settlers
above the thirty-first parallel a Gulf outlet for
their products and they had learned from experience
that as long as Spain controlled these navigable
rivers their commerce was imperilled, because of
its dominant position between the old and the new
secti-ons of the United States, in alien hands it
might become a possible menace to itoeric-in commerce.
<
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There was the danger, too, that it might be used by a
foreign por?er in time of war as a base for military
operations. Spain had shown her weakness in the
Louisiana situation and could not be expected to
maintain neutrality in any crisis. For the same
reason it was to be feared that if the United States
did not acquire the Floridas a country stronger than
Spain might gain possession and from the standpoint
of future peace and safety be much more undesirable
as a neighbor.
The original French and Spanish popu-
lation had been joined by British immigrants from the
Carolinas after 1763. After 1783 there was another
tide of settlers from Georgia and the Carolinas. These
immigrants were for the most part men of character,
although no doubt many were British in their s/mpathies
they naturally sided with the Americans rather than the
Spaniards, and with the former made an English speaking
community that developed into an insidious peril for
the Spanish government. After the purchase
of _ouisiana American filihusterers , outlaws from
c(i
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justice, frontier adventurers, began to pour into
! est Florida. Furthermore, to the citizens north
of the thirty-first parallel the exactions levied
on their commerce, and the temptations afforded by
a weak government at Baton Rouge were continual
incentives to border quarrels. The inability of
Spain to maintain order in her territory, the con-
stant menace to the contiguous territory of the
United States, the opportunity which V»est Florida
offered to such political intrigue as that carried
on by General Hilkiason and Aaron Burr, brought home
forcibly to the American government the necessity of
ending a state of affairs that promised to grow
constantly more dangerous to the well-being of the
1.
country.
Presidsnt Jefferson shared the western
spirit in that he evidently felt that every rim
passing through Spanish territory should be controlled
by America. In fact it was apparently to him such an
obvicus law of nature that he hardly considered the
political significance. In accordance with this ooint
1. I.J. Cox. - The "'est Florida Controversy, Chapters IV. and V.
(
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of view or. November 30, 1803, a bill was introduced
to carry into effect the laws of the United States
within the nev; acquisition, and on February 24, 1804,
it was signed by the President. The fourth section
of the bill directed that "all the navigable waters,
rivers, bays and inlets lying within the United States
which empty into the Gulf of Mexico east of the Mis-
sissiopi River shall be annexed to the Mississippi
district". But if the Iberville was the eastern limit
of the American territory, there were no such navigable
waters, ihe eleventh section was more explicit. It
authorized the President "whenever he shall deem it
exoedient to elect the shores, waters, and inlets of
the bay and river of Mobile, and of dbher rivers, bays,
and inlets emptying into the Gulf of Mexico east of
said river Mobile ir.to a separate district and to
establish such places within the same as he shall deem
expedient to be the port of entry for such district".^*
The two sections gave the bill its name,- The Mobile
Act, and thus embodied the theories of Livingston,
Monroe, and Jefferson in legislative action.
1. State Papers, 11:583.
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The Mobile Act seems to have been a
diplomatic blunder. It raised the question of West
Florida to one of international importance. The
American government assumed that Louisiana extended
eastward to the Perdido although Spain was in actual
possession of the disputed territory. It is easy to
uncerstand the resentment of the Spanish minister.
He protested to Madison, then Secretary of State, and
the controversy that resulted had the effect of
converting a friend of our government into an enemy,
and of making Spain unwilling to accede to any over-
tures of the United States to settle the matter on
the basis of purchase. Furthermore, it gave Spain an
opportunity to refuse to ratify the Spanish claims
convention of l£o2 unless the Mobile Act was revoked.
Ihe i\ct was modified later by the Presidant's procla-
mation of itlay 30, 1804, which declared "the shores,
waters, inlets, creeks, lying within the United States '
boundaries , a customs district with Fort Stoddert,
(which was just above the thirty-first parallel) as
1.
the port of entry.
1. American ktate Fapers, 11:575.
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We can thus understand that when
Uonroe arrived at Madrid on his special mission of
adding the Floridas to his Louisiana success he vras
decidedly disappointed. The Louisiana Purchase had
emphasized the value of the Floridas to Spain. Any
more ambitious attempts of the United States at her
expense could be neutralized if she continued to
possess the Floridas. The attitude of Spain, more-
over, depended largely upon her ups and downs in the
European situation and at that time she had the back-
ing of France. The Spanish government, faced with the
necessity of yielding to American encroachments or of
becoming even more subservient to France, chose the
latter alternative.
The influence of Napoleon could be felt
in the policy of Spain^but Napoleon had his own axe to
grind. If the boundary controversy should result in
war between Spain and the United States, the latter
country might form an alliance with Great Britain, and
that country as mistress of the seas could cut Spain
off from her productive colonies. This was of first
importance to Napoleon for he would then be cut off
IV
r
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from the secret subsidy which he exacted from Spain.
Accordingly, he bade Talleyrand instruct the French
minister, Turreau, at Y.'ashington, to act with the
Spanish minister in preventing hostilities but also
in curbing the territorial pretensions of the Amer-
icans. If war did break cut he did not doubt that
America would be willing to Day the price for the
1.
Flcridas, which he as master of France would demand.
Pinckney having failed to bargain with
the Spanish government, ^onroe was ordered to Madrid
October 25, 1604, with instructions that if Spain
refused to cede the territory east of the Perdido,
and should require as indispensable to an acknowledge-
ment of the American title to West Florida a guarantee
by the United States that their claims should not go
west of the Colorado Uver, the negotiators after
reasonable endeavors to effect their ob.iect, were to
agree to the proposed, western boundary limit and to
obtain the rest of the Floridas for a money consider-
ation. He was also to arrange for the settlement of
2.
claims covered by the convention of 1802.
1. Henry .idav.s -History of United States, 11:294,295.
2. American State Papers, 11:631,636,639.
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Ee and Pinckney continued from January to May, 1805,
Ln their efforts to negotiate. But the powerful
influence of Talleyrand «as exerted to defeat their
object. He instructed Turreau, the French minister
at ashington, as follows: "Only in case the United
States should desist from their unjust pretensions
to Test Florida and return to forms of civility and
decorum could the emperor allow himself
to second at the court of Madrid the project of the
1.
acquisition of the two Floridas". Napoleon had
determined that the United States must pay a good
sum for Florida and that the money should be for
the benefit of France. So the .American diplomats
were unable to come to an agreement on any point
and tionroe too£ formal leave of Madrid.
The student who attempts to follow
the diplomacy of Jefferson at this time travels a
rather tortuous course. At one time he favored
2.
independent action against Spain. This was
followed by the suggestion that if England should
prove easier to deal with than France the United
1. henry Adams - History of United States, 11:312
2. F.L. Ford - Writings of Jefferson, IX; 134,140,195.
c
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States might take advantage of Napoleon's camoaign
in Spain "to seize our otto limits of Louisiana and
the residue of the Floridas as reprisals for spoil-
1.
ations". The following year he was Inclined to
2.
seek the aid of Naooleon in the matter. When he
resigned the presidency he seems to have felt confi-
dent that his successor, Madison, would secure not
only the Floridas but also Cuba by the voluntary
offer of their inhabitants. This report seems to
have irritated the French minister and Madison made
haste to assure him that \hat was Mr. Jefferson's
hobby and had never been the wish of his cabinet;
and Mr. Madison values today the possession of the
Floridas only so far as they may be thought indis-
pensable to prevent every kind of misunderstanding
with Spain and secure an outlet for the produce of
3.
our southern states. "
In 1808 as a result of the overthrow
of the Spanish government by Napoleon, diplomatic
relations between the United States and Spain were
1. P.L.Ford - Writings of Jefferson, IX:203
2. Ibid: 251.
3. Henry Adams - History of United States, V: 37,38.
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suspended. Ion Luis de Cnis, the Spanish minister,
wa.s given no official recognition. Because of this
the situation in Flcrida continued unchanged until
1810 when the course of events showed that the
-esired results might be brought about by the people
of the region - the western frontiersmen were ready
to redress the balance.
The first of these events was the
insurrection in .est Flcrida. Taking advantage of
the situation in Spain, and, no doubt, carrying on
the revolutionary spirit of the South American
colonies, a party of Vest Floridans in the section
between the Mississippi and the Pearl Rivers, took
possession of the fort at Baton Rouge and declared
a free and independent government. Their next move
was to offer tc turn the territory over to the United
States for substantial considerations. Their evid-nt
yim was to force the United States to intervene so as
to maintain order in the territory as well as to
satisfy their desire fcr territorial expansion. It
was this intervention that brought the revolting region
into the union and ultimately led to the acquisition of
the rest of Florida.

38-
Ihe governor of Mississippi had
communicated with the Secretary of State in regard
to the condition of anarch./ in West Florida and
its menace to the contiguous territory. In
ison' s advice to his secretary as to the answer
to this, Governor holmes -was to keep a "watchful
eye" on Test Florida and report conditions to
Y/ashington. Furthermore, he was to have his militia
ready to protect the interests of the United States
in case of foreign intervention cr "internal convul-
sions" "by every means within the limit of executive
1.
authority".
These communications of the governor
of Mississippi, however, apparently placed President
iiadison in a quandry. .-dthough for several years he
had maintained that the territory belonged to the
United States, he doubted his executive authority to
act. There was present the ever recurring boggy in
Madison's mind of British intervention which acquired
an additional significance by British seizure of
Mierican ships, her insistence of the right of search
1. Hunt - Writings of Madison, VIII: 105.
fr
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even in American waters, and particularly the
Chesapeake affair. The British sub.iects in West
Florida had identified their interests with those
of the merieans, but in the event of war the case
might be different. In Madison's imagination was
the fear that the "successful party" might appeal
to Great Britain, the result of which might result
in a 'quadrangle contest" in which Great Britain,
France, ana Spain, would forget their own quarrels
in order to make common cause against the uostart
La
republic of the .est. accordingly, after
receiving from Governor rlolmes a copy of the West
Florida Leclnration of Independence with an explan-
atory letter addressed by its oresident to the
Secretary of State, he issued a proclamation October
27, 1810, directing Governor Claiborne of Orleans to
take immediate possession of that section and to
govern it as part of his own territory, with the
understanding "that in the h -nds of the United States
it will net cease to be a sub.iect of fair and friendly
2.
negotiation and adjustment."
1. Hunt - Writings of Madison, VI II: 109.
2. Ibid. VIII:116
r
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A month later Governors Claiborne and
Holmes were planning how to carry out these instruc-
tions. The faction which appeared to be in favor of
making terms with the United States in regard to amnes
to refugees and land titles had obtained temporary*
control, secured the adoption of a constitution, and
organized a form of government. The majority of the
people, however, were anxious for the establishment
of the authority of the United States. The Spanish
governor reinforced Madison's action by writing from
mobile to the Secretary of State that he had decided
"on delivering this province to the ^nited States
under an equitable capitulation, provided 1 do not
receive succor frc.-u Havana or Vera Cruz during the
present month The incomprehensible abandonment
in which 1 see myself, and the afflicted situation
to which the province sees itself reduced, force
1.
me to have recourse to this determination".
By using unusually tactful methods
Holme* and Claiborne succeeded in inducing all except
a few to agree to the American orogram. Thus >est
Florida in the words of Governor Holmes "willingly
i. American State Papers, 111:596,397.
(
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exchanged a system of government which peculiar
circumstances had induced them to adopt for that
of the United States an event most desirable
1.
to the great body of citizens". Thus the
claims of the United States to this territory were
expeditiously, although perhaps ruthlessly, made good.
In the meantime the revolution in Spain
against the regime of Napoleon, together with the
shifting condition of European politics, had made
Great Britain an ally of Spain. The British minister
at Washington, urged by Le Unis - who realized that
the possessions of his country in America were pass-
ing out of her hands - addressed a formal protest to
the Secretary of State stating "that such are the ties
by which his Britannic ma.jest/ is bound to Spain that
he cannot see with ino ifference any attack upon her -
2.
interests in -hmerica". The tone of his note at this
time, when Great Britain was carrying cut her high-
handed policy with American commerce, was particularly
galling to the .-imerican government and was felt to
reflect the attitude of the government of that country
1. V.cMaster - History of United States, 111:372 .
2. American State Papers, 111:399.
I
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toward the United States. Morier, the British
minister, and De Onis had both advised warlike
measures to protect the interests of their respective
governments in the 'Test Indies. The former advised
his government bo occupy Mobile jointly with Spain
in case of -war with the United States.
The Secretary of State refused to
discuss the situation with the British minister
before it twels presented to Congress. Although the
administration considered Spain the only country
concerned, Great Britain as an ally of Spain had to
be reckoned with and Madison instructed Pinckney to
inform the British government that the proclamation
in regard to West Florida was within executive
authority and justified by the condition of the
country. He was also to add that Congress would
probably not permit East Florida to pass into the
control of any other power than Spain.
Madison's instructions to Armstrong,
the minister to France, were equally curt. France was
warned that it would be unwise for her to protest or
to provoke resentment. The American charge at Paris
c
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was to inform the French cabinet that his government
was willing to discuss the claims with other nations
and suggested that France encourage the indeoendence
of the Spanish colonies.
It was Napoleon's strategy at this
time to bring about a commercial alliance with the
United States by effecting a benevolent interest,
'.cccrdingly , the French minister at S ashington was
instructed that Napoleon would not oppose the Amer-
ican occupation of the Floridas nor the independence
of the Spanish colonies. Secretary Smith's explana-
tion to Tun*3au, the French charge, that the administra-
tion acted to keep Great Britain cut of Mobile and
Pensacola, could no doubt be upheld, but when he
assured him that the administration knew nothing about
the intrigue carried on by the agents of Claiborne
and holmes he was stating that which was not in
accordance with facts . The reports of Claiborne
1.
and *ic-lmes haa guided Madison in his policy. A
good diplomat is supposed to lie abroad in the
interests of his government at home, but Smith was
lying at home to promote the interests of his
1. I. J. Cox - The Yfest Florida Controversy, Chapters XIII. -XIV., XV.
ic
-44
country abroad.
Madison had to face considerable
adverse public opinion as well as opposition in the
Senate. The Federal papers attacked his course as
unconstitutional. He was charged with taking
advantage of the weakness of Spain to seize her
territory. In his message to Congress Madison laid
down this principle of .American foreign policy as
his defense: "The United States could not see without
disquietude any part of a neighboring territory in
which they have in different respects so deep and so
just a concern pass from the hands of Spain into that
1.
of any other foreign newer". He expressed his
conviction that Congress would take the same view and
incorporate the territory with the Union.
There was sufficient possibility of
British intervention in Florida to give point to
Madison's fears. Morier, the British minister, had
acted with I>e ^nis in advising warlike measures to
protect the interests of their respective governments
in the Vest Indies. The British minister advised his
government to occupy Mobile jointly with Spain in case
1. Richardson - Messages, 1:488
(
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of war with the united States. On January 3, 1611,
Madison sent a secret message to Congress recom-
mending that the executive be authorized to take
temporary possession of any part of Florida under
certain conditions, accordingly, Congress in secret
session passed an act authorizing the President to
take possession of any part of the Floridas in case
local authorities should consent or foreign power
should attempt to occupy it. Two commissioners were
sent with instructions from Secretary Monroe that if
the local authorities were in favor of surrender, the
territory was to be accepted with engagement of
redelivery to lawful sovereignty if that should be
insisted upon, "measures ibr defense were to be taken
in case of actual appearance of any attempt to take
possession by foreign pov/er6 n
.
Any stipulations in
regard to redelivery were not to imoair the title of
1.
the United States to the country west of the Perdido.
The commissioners repaired to the
Georgian frontier. The conditions which they found
seemed to warrant prompt action. Amelia Island, just
within the Florida line, was full of British smuggling
1. American State Papers, 111:571,572.
fc
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vessels. The town of Fernandina was the center of
a smuggling trade carried on by connivance of
Spanish authorities. Matthews, one of the commis-
sioners, when he found that quiet possession was not
to be obtained, recommended to Madison that force be
used, that the people of Last Florida be encouraged
to revolt, declare their independence, and bring tho province
ever to the United States. He advised the President
to send military aid to the commandant at St. Mary's
and he would see that it was made effective without
committing the United States government. Madison's
silence he interpreted to mean consent and proceeded
with the help of a United States marshal to organize
a band of adventurers. Backed by .nmerican gunboats
stationed in the St. Gary's River to enforce the non-
importation acts then in force, they seized Fernandina
and took possession of Amelia Island. This "patriot"
army with a detachment of American troops then set off
with the purpose of capturing St. Augustine.
When Madison heard what had taken place
he recalled Matthews, stated that it was not "the policy
of the law nor purpose of the executive to wrest the
(
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1.
province forcibly from Spain". The governor of
Georgia was placed in charge with instructions that
if there were no prospect of foreign troops he was
to restore Amelia Island to Spain. The small support
given to the revolt by the inhabitants no doubt influ-
enced Madison's decision. There was no change made in
the situation, however, and the United States continued
to maintain the occupation of Fernandina until May, 1813.
In the meantime, in anticipation of the
war with Great Britain, means were taken to settle the
fate of West Florida. The territory between the Mis-
sissippi and Pearl Rivers was annexed to the new state
of Louisiana; that between the Pearl and the Mobile
district was made a part of the territory of Mississippi.
These acts could have been reasonably interpreted by
Spain as an act of war. The Spanish flag at that time
was still flying at Mobile.
On June 12, 1812, the United States had
declared war on Great Britain and recognizing the proba-
bility of the occupation of Florida by the enemy, a bill
was introduced into Congress authorizing the President
1. American State Papers, 111:572.
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to establish a government over the whole of the
Flcridas. It passed the House but was defeated
in the Senate by the enemies of the administration*
Florida During the y.'ar of 1812*
During the Var of 1812 Florida was the
scene of hostilities between the Eritish and American
forces. As had been forseen by the administration on
July 23, 1814, Pensacola and Fort Barrancas were oc-
cupied by a British force. The officer in command,
Colonel Nicncls, influenced apparently by reports
of the unsettled condition in the surrounding country,
issued a proclamation calling for volunteers to make
war upon the United States. The British flag was
hoisted along with the Spanish flags over the captured
forts and Pensacola was made the center of distribution
of arms to the warlike Indians. The aim of the British
was the forcible return to Spain of the Gulf territory
including Louisiana and New Orleans. The commanders
vere instructed to discourage any propaganda of the
inhabitants to place themselves under the dominion of
Great Britain, but to direct them to return to the
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1.
Spanish crown. Behind this policy of Great Britain
can be seen her trade interests. She had developed at
that time an extensive trade -with the Spanish provinces
in South America , and Loui siana offered a promising
field for the extension of her commerce if it were in
the hands of Spain but as American territory the pros-
pects were not as promising.
In the meantime Andrew Jackson, then
governor of Tennessee, had been sent to quell the
rebellious Creek Indians. After a crushing defeat
of the tribes at Horseshoe Bend he had concluded a
treaty by which the greater part of their lands were
ceded to the United States. Having been made major-
general, in comr.and of the military department of the
South, when the news reached him of the landing of an
English force at Pensacola he resolved to put the
theories of the administration into action. The
English had taken the aggressive and sailed from
Pensacola to Mobile. Jackson led his victorious
forces to Mobile, repulsed the British force which
sailed back to Pensacola. After receiving reinforce-
ments he marched across the country and appeared before
1. Henry Adams - History of United States, VIII:314,315.
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Pensacola. The British abdicated the forts and
Jackson followed up his demand upon the Spanish
governor for surrender by an assault that forced
capitulation. Less than e week later he was at
Mobile.
Previous to his expedition against
Pensacola ,Secretary £"onrce had written to Jackson
warning him against any action that would precipitate
war with Spain. But the communication did not reach
him until after his military acts had taken place.
Ve can safely infer, nevertheless, that Jackson
would have acted on his own judgment and inclinations
rather than the wavering policy of the administration.
He passed by leisurely stages to New Orleans where
took place the battle that won him an enduring place
among the heroes of rimerican history.
r
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Jackson's Invasion of East Florida*
The end of the war did not mark the end
of English influence in Florida. English officers
lingered in the country after peace had been declared*
Colonel Nichols, without the official approval of his
government, took up the cause of the Creek Indians
and demanded in their name the surrender of the lands
which they had ceded to the United States. He went
so far as to build a fort on the Apalachicola River
in which he stored ammunition and guns. After his
departure for England this fort was seized by a number
of fugitive negro slaves from Georgia who made it the
center of raids upon the frontier of Georgia, ^ackson,
cting under the directions of the Secretary of War,
called the attention of the Spanish governor at Pensa-
cola to what was going on and warned him that if action
was not immediately taken the United States would be
1.
compelled in self-defense to act. The governor was
either unwilling or unable to act and Jackson resolved
to take the matter into his own hands, he wrote to
General G Lr s, who, under Jackson, was in charge of
the maint eaance of order in that district, that this
1. American State Papers, IV: 556.
Jackson to Governor Zunia, April 23, 1816.
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fort should be destroyed. The blowing up of the
fort in which were nearly three hundred men, women,
and children, all of whom met a horrible death is
an example of the barbarity of border warfare at
that time.
This was the opening act in the second
invasion of Florida by Jackson. Meanwhile the Sem-
inole Indians in revenge for the loss of their lands,
were on the war path. Joined by escaped negroes they
attacked the frontier settlements. The burning of
an Indian village by a body of troops sent by
General Gaines and the seizure of the chief brought
on the Seminole War.
The Tfer Department had been dealing
with a filibustering situation on Amelia Island with
which the powerless condition of the Spanish govern-
ment was unable to cope. A naval force had been sent
there, together with a detachment of troops, and on
December 17, 1617, the filibustering adventurers made
up of Americans, English and Irish sailors on the one
side, and brigand negroes on the other, were forced
to surrender, and the American flag was hoisted. As
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Boon as the news of the Indian outbreak reached
Trashington, Jackson was ordered to take command in
person and carry the war to a conclusion. But
before the orders reached him Jackson had sent a
letter to Monroe, then President, urging the
seizure of the whole of Last Florida to be "held
as an indemnity for the outrages of Spain". He
concluded his letter by asserting "Let it be sig-
nified to me through any channel (say Mr. J. Rhea)
that the possession of Florida would be desirable
by the United States and in sixty days it will be
1.
accomplished". Vrhat reply was made to this
letter will probably never be known. President
Monroe's explanation was that it had been received
during an attack of illness and that he did not even
read it until after the war was ended. Jackson, on
the other hand, maintained that he received from
President Monroe through Mr. Rhea (the Congressman
from Tennessee) an approval of his plans. Be that
as it may, Jackson crossed the border and appeared
with Captain Lc.ee r, ho cooperated v/ith him by
sea, before St. Marks which was his first point of
attack. He entered the town, hauled down the Spanish
*
1. Chad-.vick - Relations of United Statos and Spain, 1:128
f
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flag, and raised the Stars and Stripes. Incidentally,
he took pains to inform the Spanish commander that
al~ this was necessary as long as trouble with the
Indians lasted. After destroying Indian strongholds
and capturing important pests in northern Florida,
he returned to St. Marks with two English prisoners,
-
^rbuthnot and .-mbrister - whom he executed, after
trial by courtmartial for complicity in inciting the
Indians against the Americans. ith his correspondence
describing the taking of St. Marks:, Jackson enclosed
documents showing that the Spanish commander was aid-
ing the Indian enemies of the United States by supoly-
ing them with ammunition while at the same time pro-
1.
fessing friendship.
Jackson now received word that some
hostile Indians were being harbored at Pensacola.
He set off for the .est Florida capital, paying no
attention to the protests from the Spanish governor
against his invasion of the territory of Spain.
Pensacola fell into his hands as easily as St. Marks .
After receiving the surrender of the Spanish governor
1. Jackson's Report, American State Papers, Military
Affairs, 1:702.
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and troops, Jacicson agreed to provide for their
transportation to Havana at the expense of the
United States. After organizing the district as
an American province he recrossed the border con-
fident that what he had cone would bring Spain to
terms.
But even Jackson could hardly have
been prepared for the storm of criticism that
followed his Florida expedition. There was
consternation in official circles in Washington
where war with England and Spain was feared as a
result. While the people at large applauded
Jackson, he was the target of abuse in Congress
and his head was demanded by the European powers.
As might be expected there was violent protest in
England over the execution of two British subjects,
and as Castlereagh remarked to the American minister
"the turn of a finger might have brought on war".
But tne British cabinet disavowed the conduct of
the traders and the affair was dismissed as not of
sufficient importance to warrant interference.
r
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Lth the restoration of the monarch
and renewal of diplomatic relations with Spain in
1815, our minister again offered to purchase Florida.
But the Spanish government which which he had to deal
was based on absolutism, and no progress was made,
de
At V/ashington Onis, the Spanish minister, assumed
that negotiations would besrin where they left off
before the revolution in Spain. He, therefore
,
demanded the return of V,est Florida. He called
attention to the .imericun privateers that had been
fitted out to aid the revolting provinces in South
America and the damage of such procedure to Spain.
Baltimore and Charleston had been the centers of
trade with American vessels sailing under the flags
of the new provinces. John ,uincy Adams states in
his memoirs, "The misfortune is not that this has
spread over a large portion of merchants and popula-
tion of Baltimore, but that it has infected almost
ever / officer of the United States in the place. "
After naming the Postmaster and the son of the
District attorney he savs
,
"They are all fanatics
of the South American cause The District Judge,
Houston, and the Circuit Judge, Duval, are both
<
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inefficient men over whom Villian PLnckney, emplo/ed
by the pirates as their counsel, domineers like a
slave driver over his negroes .... .The political con-
dition of Baltimore is as rotten as corruption can
1.
make it n .
In the correspondence which took
place the -American Secretary of State, cn the other
hand, was able to present reports from United States
officers showing that a number of captured vessels
had been restored to their owners and that in other
cases violation of neutrality
The demands of Spain, as presented
by de Onis, included the delivery of the contested
territory - 7est Florida - to Spain before that
power would consider the western boundary which
Adams was anxious to settle. The internal dissec-
tions which so profoundly affected Spanish history
after 1808, the influence of her varying fortunes
in South America and Mexico, must be considered
in any attempt to understand her motives and policies.
A very close connection existed between affairs in
Lurcpe and the protracted negotiations for a treaty.
1. Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, IV:318,319.

-58-
A political upheaval at this time brought in a
change of ministry and our government was surorised
with an offer to exchange Florida for Louisiana.
But the time for such a proposition had gone by.
John -uincy Adams was a well-equipped, able,
Secretary of State, and his policy was to hold on
to Louisiana with the Rio Grande as its western
boundary, and to maintain the American claim to
est Florida. On January 15, 1818, he proposed to
de Onis that "Spain cede all the territory east of
the Mississippi, leave the western boundary unset-
tled for further ar rsjigement; or, make Colorado to
its source the boundary, and thence to the northern
limits of Louisiana; the claims of both nations to
be arbitrated; Florida lands east of the Perdido to
be answerable for such claims. No Spanish land
grants in Florida subsequent to August, 1812, were
to be valid. Spain was to be relieved from all
1.
debts to the United States.. Negotiations promised
success when the news of Jackson's invasion of Florida
interrupted friendly diplomacy.
1. American State Papers, IV: 484.
I
The Spanish note of July 18, 1618,
summed up the military acts of Jackson against
Spain, defended the Spanish government against
the charge of aiding and encouraging the hostile
Indians, demanded the restoration of the territory
seized, indemnity, and the prompt punishment of
Jackson. The timorous Monroe and his cabinet, with
the exception of Adams, were in favor of repudiating
Jackson and indemnifying Spain, but John ^uincy Adams
proved to be a strong defendant. He insisted that
the necessities of the case amply justified Jackson's
proceedings. Hio reply to Spain ended thus: "I am
instructed to inform you that Pensacola will be
restored to the possession of any person duly author-
ized by Spain to receive it, that the fort of St.Marks
....can be surrendered only to a force sufficiently
strong to hold it against the attack of hostile
Indians, and upon the appearance of which force it
will also be restored .The preservation of
peace between the two nations requires that hence-
forth the stipulations of Spain to restrain by force
her Indians from all hostility against the United
States should be faithfully and effectually fulfilled.
1. American State Papers, IV; 497-499.
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When this note of -idams reached
Madrid the American minister there was notified
that Spain would end all negotiations until amends
were made for Jackson's action. This note, which
was virtually a threat of war, was replied to by
^dams in a state paper that is among the ablest
ever sent out from that department. It reviewed
in detail the grievances of the United States
against Spain, - the repeated breaches of neutrality,
outrages committed by Indians, fugitive slaves and
outlaws who found sanctuary in Spain's dominions,
her failure to fulfill her treaty obligations.
He declared that Jackson would not be punished for
conduct the motives of which "were founded in purest
patriotism". The Spanish government was further
informed that if it were necessary for the United
States to take possession again of the SDanish forts
1.
in Florida a surrender of them must not be expected.
As has been mentioned, Spain refused
the American offer to buy Florida in 1815. Behind
the pretentious demands of Spain at that time the
backing of England was suspected. In the light of
t(
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her military operations in Florida during the >7ar of
1812, this was probably natural. When the failure to
come to a diplomatic settlement betokened war between
Spain and the Unitea States, the British minister
offered his services as mediator. As Great Britain
showed no inclination to help Spain out of her dif-
ficulties, President Edison refused to be alarmed
by rumors of British machinations. Neither was the
new Bourbon government of France encouraging when
appealed to by the Spanish ambassador at Paris for
an opinion on the interpretation of the disputed
article in the Treaty of San Ildefonso. The opinion
was withheld, but advice was given to reach a settle-
ment after the rights of each concerned had been
arrived at through discussion. Spain was seemingly
abandoned by both England and France.
<t
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Final Negotiations.
The arguments of Mams in the light of
the situation in Florida must have made clear to Spain
her inability to maintain an efficient government in
the province. The Spanish ministry consequently recog-
nized the wisdom of giving up Florida on the best terms
that could be gained. The ^ing empowered the Spanish
minister to part with Florida and settle the boundary
of Texas. The final negotiations, therefore, were
more concerned with the western boundary. The Spanish
provinces in South .America and the commercial relations
between them and the United States were an important
factor in the discussions. For months Adams and the
Spanish minister contended over the question whether
the Rio Grande, the Colorado, the Sabine, or some
more easterly boundary should be adopted as the western
boundary of the United States. Considerable credit
should be given to De Neuville, the French minister,
as an intermediary in bringing about the final agree-
ment. Adams was unwilling to give up Texas, but
finally yielded to pressure from Monroe and others
and accepted the Sabine River as the boundary. The
(I
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policy of Adams is stated in his memoirs: "In all
negotiations conducted by me while Secretary of
State whenever anything was conceded, it
was by direction of the President •••• especially
1.
so In the negotiations of the Florida treaty.
The loss of Texas which was so harshly criticized
in Congress was, therefore, due to Monroe and his
cabinet, not to any weakness on the part of
John Zuincy --xiams.
The treaty was finally signed on
February 23, 1819, Article II. provided : "His
Catholic iuaiesty cedes to the United States in full
property and sovereignty all the territories which
belong to him east of the Liississiopi lUver known
by the name of hast and West Florida". The clause
"which belong to him" is significant as being sug-
gested by Adams as open to an interpretation which
2.
would save the contentions of both nations*
iirticle III. established the boundary between the
United States and the Spanish possessions on the
West by a line from the Gulf of Mexico along the
1. Memoirs, VIII: 186.
2. Ibid. IV:218
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western bank of the Sabine River to the thirty-
second degree of latitude. It then zigzagged by
rivers and parallels to the forty-second parallel
I.
and thence to the Pacific Ocean. It thus created
the first international boundary that touched the
Pacific. In addition to the transfer of territory
the United States agreed to take over the claims
of American citizens to the amount of five million
dollars.
The ratification of the treaty passed
the Senate with only six dissenting votes; but Spain
delayed official action for two years on various
pretexts, but really because the King wished to
prevent the United States from recognizing the
independence of the South American provinces which
he knew would follow the ratification of the treaty.
1. Malloy - Treaties and Conventions, 11:1651.
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Conclusiona
The diplomacy of the acquisition of
Florida does not reflect credit on the history of
our foreign relations. It may be argued that it
prevented an open war with Spain. But it seems
evident that it was the manifest weakness of Spain
and her warranted distrust of Great Britain that
prevented her joining that country openly in the
War of 1812. The United States, no doubt, profited
by the helplessness of Spain as a tool in the hands
of her European allies, and it was only when abandoned
by those allies and torn by revolution that she was
forced to comply with the terms of the Treaty of 1819.
Neither can we argue that it hastened what was already
foreordained when the .American settler crossed over
the mountains. Time and the law of natural selection
were in his favor. It is obvious that he would have
brought about the union of the Floridas with the
United States as he later brought about the annexation
of Texas. His methods may have been as open to criticism
but they would have been more defensible than the blunder
diplomacy of the statesmen.
<
SUMMARY
During the critical period that followed the Revolutionary
War Spain cherished the hope that fortune would throw the valley of the
Mississippi and the Gulf coast into her hands. She had obtained
Louisiana from France in 1763 and England had ceded her Florida in the
treaty of Paris. She also held tenaciously to the navigation of the
Mississippi which made it possible for her to control not only the
mouth of that river but the Gulf of Mexico.
This situation caused such dissatisfaction among the
frontier settlers that plans were considered for a separation from the
East. Spain hoped that the development of this feeling would result
in the annexation of these prosperous settlements, and hired agitators
to spread favorable propaganda among the people. She also used the
Indians so as to make life so dangerous for the Americans that they
would place themselves under her protection.
The United States realized the need of diplomatic action
and Thomas Pinckney, our minister to Madrid, was instructed to maks a
treaty, if possible. The Spanish minister was willing to meet him half-
way partly because he feared the effect of the Jay treaty between the
United States and England, and on October 27, 1795, an agreement ms
signed at Madrid which settled the boundary of '.Test Florida at the
thirty-first degree of latitude and gave the Americans the "right of
deposit" at New Orleans. The latter satisfied the demands of the
western people for the time.

Franco had never been reconciled to the loss of Louisiana
and under the strong regime of Napoleon it was planned to re-establish
the French Empire in the western world. After a weak resistance Spain
in 1300 signed the treaty of San Ildefonso "retroceding" Louisiana to
Spain. The terms of the treaty were to be kept secret, but rumors of
the cession, which was supposed to include Florida, leaked out.
President Jefferson was strongly opposed to French occupation and
instructed Livingston, our representative at Paris, to act with
James Monroe in negotiating for the purchase of Florida and New Orleans.
The course of events, however, made Napoleon anxious to dispose of
Louisiana. Monroe and Livingston therefore signed the treaty which
transferred to the United States the territory of Louisiana "with the
same limits that it had when ceded by Spain to France", for the sum of
fifteen million dollars.
The fact that the Louisiana purchase did not define the
boundaries of the territory resulted in many years of controversy
between the United States and Spain. The Spanish government maintained
that Napoleon had agreed not to alienate Louisiana, and that West
Florida was not included in the cession. The United States, on the
other hand, claimed the Ferdido River as the eastern boundary, asserted
its rieht to West Florida, and waited for the course of events in
Europe to make it good. From "the standpoint of "the settlers of Kentucky
and Tennessee, Louisiana was not a compensation for the gulf fringe of
West Florida. In February, 1804, by a proclamation of President Madison,
the Mobile region was organized as a custom district but no attempt
was made to take possession until 1810, when, after a revolution by

the inhabitants, Governor Claiborne of the New Orleans territory
was ordered to occupy the territory. In 1814, during the war vdth
England, General Jackson took permanent possession.
In 1811 by a secret act of Congress, President Madison
was authorized to take possession of East Florida. Commissioners
were sent down, another revolution staged, and Amelia Island seized.
The American troops were withdrawn in 1813.
From 1814 to 1819 Florida was the seat of guerilla warfare
and general disorder which was a constant menace to the contiguous
territory. Spain had not maintained neutrality during the War of 1812,
and she had failed to fulfill her part of the treaty of Ildefonso—to
prevent Indian attacks on the United States.
In 1817 General Jackson was ordered to put an end to the
Indian attacks. In pursuing the Seminole Indians he captured the
Spanish forts in northern Florida and Pensacola.
The serious complication with Spain which followed these
acts of Jackson were settled through the forcible diplomacy of John
Quincy Adams by the Treaty of 1819. By this treaty the United States
secured both Floridas and assumed the claims of its citizens against
Spain to the extent of five million dollars. The Florida question
was at last settled.
s
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It was Jay's opinion that the opening of the rivor to
American commerce could never be secured except as the
1
.
result of an aggressive war. This question of the
Mississippi was becoming increasingly important with
the years to the people of the United States. At this
time, and for some years later, the only road to market
for the settlers west of the mountains was along the
Mississippi. As long as the navigation of that river
could be hindered, the grcwth of the West was checked.
The Spaniards of New Orleans had closed that gate to
the comnsrce of Kentucky and Tennessee and below their
outposts no boat could descend the river without the
consent of the Spanish authorities.
Meanwhile the government of the United
States did not relax its efforts to get the Spanish
questions settled. Matters in the West were fast
reaching a crisis. Undisguised plans for separation
from the East were being considered. The westerners
naturally felt that these vital interests of the West
were being sacrificed to the commercial interests of
the East.
1. Chadwick - Relations of United states and Spain, I.
Adams - History of Foreign Policy United States, IV.
r
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Spain watched the development of this
feeling among the frontiersmen with great interest.
She hoped to make use of the situation to further her
own ends. What she had not gained by treaty she hoped
to obtain through intrigue - the detachment of the
South-west from the land on both sides of the Lississippi.
Skilfull agitators vore hired to spread propaganda
favorable to Spain. Among these was James Wilkenscn,
who continued to be in the pay of the Spanish government
even after he became a high officer in the American army.
Fortunately, the threatened dangers were avoided although
the sentiment in the South-west in favor of separation
1.
did not disappear at once.
From the Spanish duplicity with the whites
we turn to their schemes with the Indians. One of the
crafty plans of Spain was to unite the Indian tribes in
opposition to America. The difference between the methods
of the Spanish and Americans was a vital matter to the
Indians. Wherever the Spaniard went among the Indians,
trading posts and European goods followed; but in the wake
of the frontiersmen from the other side of the mountains
farms, roads and fortified places sprang up. There is good
1. ">rinsor - Westward ^overrent - 356-360, 369-371.
I
-10-
evidence that Spain set on foot Indian attacks on the
settlers of Kentucky and Tennessee. This was in line
with her policy of making the situation so hazardous
for the American settlers that they would turn to her
for relief. When the settlers appealed to the Confeder-
ation, that government, then carrying on its ticklish
negotiations with Spain, gave orders that there should
be only defensive action. But the people refused to
submit, took matters into their own hands, and in an
expedition against the Indians dealt them a severe blow.
It is significant that documentary evidence of Spanish
complicity in the recent outrages were found on this
expedition. It was this condition - indignation at what
the westerners considered the inactivity of the federal
government in regard to the closing of the ilississippi,
at the Indian outbreaks, coupled with the traditional
hatred of the Anglo-Saxon for tho Spaniard - that furnished
the opportunity for Genet and his agents in the West.
The news of the projected attacks on the
Spanish colonies instigated by Genet, and of the tone of
Washington 1 s message to Congress reached Madrid in the
summer of 1794, at a time when affairs in Europe were
becoming serious for Spain. The good will of the United
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Statos began to be worth cultivating. The Spanish Charge
at Philadelphia suggested to the American government that
a special envoy be sent to Madrid to expedite the treaty
arrangements. Accordingly, Thomas Finckney who was
minister to England, was shifted to Madrid to reinforce
the American Commissioners there. Pincloiey's commission
was dated November 24, 1794. On that same day John Jay,
in London, wrote to i-ionroe, in Paris, that a treaty
betvreen the United States and his Britanic Majesty had
beer signed.
After some delay a treaty between Spain
and the United States was signed at Madrid, October 27,
1795. Spain accepted the thirty-first parallel as the
boundary of V,rest Florida and agreed that the navigation
of the Mississippi from its source to the ocean should
be the right of American citizens. It also gave permis-
sion for the" right of deposit". After three years if
this right should be withdrawn, another place should be
substituted. Both nations were to "restrain by force
all hostilities on the part of the Indian nations living
1
.
within their borders".
1. Stvte Papers - 1:546-549
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It is an interesting; question as to what effect Jay's
treaty with England had upon the course of Pinckney's
negotiations. It seems obvious enough that fear of
England, a possible attack upon Louisiana by way of
the Mississippi, and the weakness of Spain in Europe,
all worked together to make possible the development
of that vast region which depended upon the free
navigation of the Mississippi for its very existence.
The treaty was, however, but a stop-gap
to difficulties. The main difficulty was the impossi-
bility that the men who settled Kentucky and Tennessee
should accept the dominance of the King of Spain over
the right of way to the sea. The historian, Henry Adams,
sums up the feeling which had grown up in the West and
South; "Of all foreign powers Spain alone stood in
such a position as to make violence seem sooner or later
inevitable even to the pacific Jefferson; and every
southern or western state looked to the military occu-
pation of Mobile, pensacola, and New Orleans, as a future
political necessity. By a sort of tacit agreement the
ordinary rules of American politics were admitted not to
apply to this case. To obtain Pensacola, Mobile, and
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New Orleans the warmest states' rights champions in the
South were ready to employ every instrument of centrali-
zation. On the part of the central and -western states
this eagerness to -.xpel Spain from their nei ghborhood
acted like a magnet affecting all without regard to
theories or parties. " Against Indians and Spaniards
alike the western states held loose notions of lav/; his
settled purpose was to drive both races from the country
1.
and to seize their lands."
1. Henry Adams - History of United itates, 1:338-340
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Purchase of Louisiana
To the student of the early history of
the United States it is easy to realize that from the
moment Daniel Boone opened the pathway to the West the
future expansion of the American people v/as inevitable,
and that if the Mississippi barrier to westward expan-
sion had not been removed when it was by the purchase
of vast territory to the west, it v/ould have been removed
later at the cost not of dollars but of blood.
The Louisiana country, it must be
remembered, had originally belonged to France. Never
had she been reconciled to the fate that ousted her
completely from these territories, compelling her to
hand them over in part to England as the result of
conquest, and in part to Spain as a result of an
alliance. For a time, weakened by internal dissensions
that culminated in the Revolution, she was obliged to
put aside all thought of recovery of her lost territories
over seas. Tfith the advent of Hapoleon and under his
masterful influence came the hopes of rebuilding the
New World empire of France. With this end in view
Napoleon, taking advantage of the weakness of Spain,
persuaded the Spanish monarch to cede the province of
(?
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Louisiana back to France. He desired, if possible, to
obtain a cession of Florida also. The Floridas he failed
to obtain, but on October 1, 1800, the day following that
on which a treaty betwesn France and the United States
ended the difficulties that had brought about a state of
war between the two countries, the treaty of Ildefonso
was signed between France and Spain. By this treaty
Spain ceded to France "the colony and province of
Louisiana with the sane extent it now lias in the hands
of Spain, that it had when France possessed it, and such
as it ought to be according to the treaties subsequently
u
passed between Spnin and other states".
The aim of TaUsyirand who had been instrumen-
tal in bringing about this change of territory is plainly
made known in this letter to the French minister at Madrid.
"There are no other means of putting an end to the ambitions
of the Americans than by shutting them up within the limits
which nature seems to have traced for them; but Spain is
net in a condition to do this work alone Let the
court of Madrid cede these districts (the Floridas and
Louisiana) to France and from the moment the power of
1. Latane ',American Foreign Policy, P. 110
(
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America is bounded by the limits which iry suit the
interests and tranquility of France and Spain to assign
1.
her."
Rumors of the transfer of Louisiana,
which it was supposed included the Floridas, had begun
to come to the United States early in 1801 through
2.
ifr« Rufus King, minister to London. It was a one-
sided bargain for Spain but it promised to be menacing
for the United States by imposing upon her a povferful
and aggressive neighbor. The news caused the greatest
uneasiness. Instructions were at once sent to the
minister at Madrid urging him to find out what truth
there was in the reports concerning the retrocession.
I'othing definite could be learnea but the rumors were
sufficiently convincing to cause Jefferson to instruct
Livingston, the American minister at Paris, to make
plain to France the attitude of the United States) and
to open negotiations for the purchase of New Orleans
and the Floridas. "The day that France takes possession
of New Orleans", wrote Jefferson, "fixes the sentence
1. Henry Adams: History of United States, 1:355

-17-
which is to restrain her forever within her low water
mark. It seals the union of two nations who in conjunction
can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From
that moment '7/e must marry ourselves to the British fleet
and nation. We must turn all our attention to a maritime
force, for which our resources place us on very high
grounds; and having formed and cemented together a power
which may render reinforcements of her settlements here
impossible to France, make the first cannon which shall
be fired in Europe the signal for tearing up any settle-
ments she may have made, and for holding the two continents
in America in sequestration for the common purposes of the
united British and American nations. This is not a state
of things we desire or seek. It is one which this measure,
if adopted by France, forces on us, as necessary as any
other cause, by the laws of nature, brings on its necessary
1.
effect."
Remembering the feeling of Jefferson toward
England since the days of the Declaration of Independence,
nothing shows more clearly how aroused he was. But it must
be noted that his main care was not to keep the French out
of Louisiana but to keep them out of New Orleans and thus
1. Latane', American Foreign Policy FP101-102
Quotations from Writings of Jefferson, IX. (April 18, 1802)
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make sure that the gateway to their markets would remain
open to the Mississippi folks. In this same letter
Jefferson bade Livingston inform the French government
that the cession of the Floridas and New Orleans to
the United States "would certainly in a great degree
remove the causes and irritation between us".
In the meantime the army which Napoleon had
meant for the occupation of Louisiana had been destroyed
in an attempt to put down an insurrection in Santo
Domingo. This event was very important in its bearing
upon the Louisiana Purchase. Coincident with the news of
this disaster, information was received that the old-tine
prohibition of the "right of deposit" was renewed without
an equivalent establishment being arranged for, as required
by the Treaty of 1795. At once the westerners besieged
the national government with demands for redress. The act
was considered by them as prompted by Kapoleon and a sample
of what could be expected under French ownership. The
Spanish minister assured Jefferson that the act of the
Spanish intendent at Lew Orleans was unauthorized and, in
fact, was later withdrawn. Its effect upon Congress, however,
was the appropriation of two million dollars to cover expenses
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